Introduction
The most commonly known water management effort of the Netherlands surely is the protection against flooding. Some other aspects of water management however have received more attention during the last decades as a policy issue. The history of water management in the Netherlands shows how the emphasis has shifted over the years and how this management has become more wide-ranging. In the course of time it has passed through four stages. The first period is distinguished by protection against flooding of seawater through the building of dikes. The main concern was `keeping one's feet dry'. This period started early in the Middle Ages. Safety has increased since then. In the second period protection against flooding remained a concern, but involvement in the control of the water level for the benefit of agriculture and shipping was added to that. In the third period the emphasis shifted to the protection of water quality. Reconstruction and expansion of industry predominated after the second World War. Agriculture was also swept along in this industrialization process, leading to prosperity but also to a veritable surge of pollution. To combat this threat, the 1970 Pollution of Surface Water Act and the 1975 Pollution of Sea Water Act came into force. For a number of substances the result is clearly demonstrable.
The fourth period can be characterized as integrated care for the condition and use of water systems. This period started in 1985 with the memorandum `Living with Water', in which the idea of `integral water management' based on an approach of water systems or water areas as a whole was introduced. Multifunctional and sustained use are prominent now. The question today is how those diverse interests can be reconciled.
The development of water management is analysed in these four periods in which concern for water was repeatedly adapted to new social demands, whilst retaining existing policy issues.
As suggested in the introduction of this volume, networks can be characterized on several dimensions (cf. Van Waarden, 1992) . In this article we concentrate on the dimension of integration vs. fragmentation. At one end of this dimension networks can be classified as `policy communities'. At the other extreme networks are mere `issue networks' (cf. Rhodes and March, 1992: 183) . Kenis and Schneider (1991: 40-42 ) see networks as a specific class of policy making structures beyond or between `policy markets' and `policy hierarchies'. These specific structural arrangements can be characterized on the basis of three elements: actors involved, their linkages and the structure's boundary. In order to distinguise between policy communities and issue networks, Jordan (1981: 95) specifies these items of the following variables: the number of actors involved, the stability of the relations and the openess/closedness of the arena. Jordan and Schubert (1992: 25) combine the first and third variable and replace the second by the sectoral or trans-sectoral scope of the network to distinguise between policy communities and issue networks. The background for this variable is that competing belief systems and interests hamper the networks' ability to act. Van Waarden (1992: 46) characterizes `issue networks', not only by their open boundaries and resulting high number of participants, but also by the difficulty in tracing the locus of decision-making and by their diffuse dependencies and power relations as à principal characteristic'.
In our view the `number of participants' as such is a risky variable to characterize a network. This variable heavily depends on the level of analysis, interpersonal or interstructural (cf. Rhodes and March, 1992: 185 ). Only when a certain level of analysis is fixed, can the number of participants can be regarded as a relevant factor for the degree of fragmentation of decision-making. Van Waarden seems to imply that fragmentation of decisionmaking is a main characteristic of issue networks. Dietz and Rycroft (1987: 77-101) characterize policy communities with the variables `personal contacts' (outreach, prominence and the intensity of communication), `personnel flows across organisations', legitimacy (sympathy for a particular groups policy position) and `power'. The last variable is in fact not being used seperately but to measure whether the estimated power of the participants matches the distribution of sympathy. In total, these variables seem to measure a metavariable that can be labeled as `integration'. Kingdon (1984: 123-125) stresses the importance of the degree of fragmentation. His description of transportation and health communities shows that he does not regard the number of participants a key factor, but rather the degree of interaction between them and the degree to which participants share the same understanding of what the sector is about. The number of actors is important so far only in as it changes the type of interaction within the network.
The variables used by Dietz and Rycroft and Kingdon reflect structural, cognitive and affective aspects of the dimension of integration vs. fragmentation. The structural variable is the intensity and stability of mutual interaction. This interaction may consist of written and verbal communication, but also of exchange of personnel and the existence of formalized meeting groups and active intermediaries, which aim at an improvement of the contacts whitin the network. In an earlier paper we referred to this variable as interrelatedness' (Bressers and Kuks, 1992: 10) . The effective aspect of the dimension of integration vs. fragmentation can be termed `commitment': the extent to which individuals, groups and organisations within the network sympathize with each others' main objectives, as far as these objectives are relevant to the policy area (Bressers and Kuks, 1992: 11) . The cognitive aspect is not always easy to separate from the affective aspect and is for this reason excluded from the typology we introduce below. However it relates to thè belief systems' of the actors involved, the causal relationships they assume in the policy area.
The extent of interrelatedness and the extent of commitment can both be distinguished dichotomally, yielding a matrix with four cells. Of course deny the fact that many situations can be intermediate with respect to the distinguished variables. `Policy communities' are characterized by a combination of strong commitment and strong interrelatedness, `issue networks' by a combination of weak commitment and weak interrelatedness. Though both characteristics will tend to reinforce each other (Kingdon, 1984: 126) , there is no reason to assume that the other two combinations will not occur.
Which influences can we expect these different types of networks to have on policy formulation and policy implementation? Kenis and Schneider (1991: 45) regard as one of the main applications of network analysis `cross-networks comparisons to develop (or test) hypotheses explaining the effect of aggregate characteristics of the policy network on specific interactions'. Though the scope of this article does not allow testing hypotheses on these influences, some explicit expectations can serve as a useful background for the description in the following sections.
Our central hypothesis suggests that in the case of policy formulation the initial characteristics of the network will tend to reproduce themselves by means of the choice of goals and instruments (cf. Luhmann, 1984; Majone, 1989: 116-144; Rhodes and March, 1992: 198) . With respect to the policy objectives we simply assume that a strong commitment will result in a relatively strong resistance by policy makers to objectives that require an extensive behavioural change of `their' target group. In this case the resistance is aimed at the `outside world', which tries to force these objectives upon the network.
For policy networks with a weak interrelatedness and a weak commitment (`issue networks'), we expect a preference for direct regulation. For the case of weak interrelatedness combined with strong commitment, we expect an emphasis on subsidies for investments and investigation and written information. A strong interrelatedness and a weak commitment will lead to an emphasis on responsibility (self-regulation) and the use of covenants and other negotiated instruments. A combination of strong interrelatedness and strong commitment (`policy communities') will lead to a relatively pragmatic choice of instruments. Subsidies and personal information (education and advise) will be the most important instruments, although there also will be room for all other types of instruments when they seem to be necessary to restore `law and order in our own house' (Bressers, 1993) .
The relation between fragmentation in the network and policy implementation has been subject to extensive debate. Edwards (1980: 134-141) views fragmentation as `the dispersion of responsibilities for a policy among several organisational units'. Though his conceptualization of fragmentation is somewhat different from ours, the results of fragmentation he expects are nevertheless relevant: difficult coordination, duplication of services, agencies working at cross-purposes, functions that fall between the cracks, and agencies developing narrow foci, leading to inflexibility. Likewise, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981: 11-12 ) use a concept of integration that is interesting for our purposes because they relate it to policy implementation. They operationalize integration in terms of (a) the number of veto/clearance points, and (b) the extent to which supporters of statutory objectives are provided with power over those with a potential veto. Because (b) is often absent, (a) is extremely important in their view. They regard the difficulty of obtaining coordinated action as one of the best-documented findings in implementation literature (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989: 27) . `To the extent that the system is only loosely integrated, there will be considerable variation in the degree of behavioural compliance among implementing officials and target groups as each responds to the incentives for modification within their local setting.' Both Edwards and Mazmanian and Sabatier seem to aggree that lack of integration poses a major threat to successful implementation.
As a possible contribution to a strategy of handling lack of integration, Winter (1990: 29-31) refers to Bardach's idea of creating a `fixer' as a structuring device. More fundamental are the questions posed by Goggin and others. They relate the essence of network analysis to the `bottum up'-perspective on implementation (Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O'Toole, 1990a: 185) . They regard the idea that a uniform and hierarchically well integrated administrative structure leads to a better implementation as a `top down' view. Several `bottum-up' studies give examples of complicated structures actually encouraging success during implementation. They conclude that while simple and integrated structures are likely to produce a smooth process, it is important to keep in mind that prompt implementation does not always lead to optimal outputs and outcomes. Complicated and dynamic policy areas might benefit from complicated and dynamic implementation structures, not for realizing planned action, but for grasping any chance to enhance goal-attainment.
The way in which we operationalized the dimension of integration vs. fragmentation, setting complexity aside and focusing on interaction and sympathy, links the concept to the notion that integration is good for implementation, including outputs. However, we also pay attention to complexity as a separate network characteristic.
The article concentrates on three sectors: surface water, groundwater and seawater. Seawater quality protection is partly dependent on surface water management. Another distinction is: legislation on quantity-aspects, legislation on quality-aspects and legislation on institutional aspects within each water sector. While quantity and quality aspects are often integrated in the responsibilities of water management agencies, the division of surface water management and ground water management (including drinking water production) is reflected in the existence of separate agencies, with relatively few linkages. Water management in the Netherlands is therefore formulated and implemented in at least two separate policy networks. Table 1 gives an overview of the actors involved in ground water management and surface water management at the national, regional and local level in the Netherlands. Section 2 of this article discusses ground water protection and drinking water supply. Section 3 will focus on the policy network involved in surface water management. Both sections attempt to describe and characterize these networks in terms of complexity, commitment and interrelatedness, give some of their history and assess their influence on relevant policy formulation and implementation processes and outputs. Section 4 compares both networks in relation to the theoretical concepts described in this section and in terms of the developments in their scope, approach and openness.
Ground
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The network of organisations involved in ground water management
The water supply sector growing into a policy community
Environmental interests have only recently gained attention within Dutch ground-water management. Initially, groundwater was managed only for reasons of supplying drinking water and for related reasons of health care. For that purpose the Ministry for Health Care introduced the Water Supply Act in 1957, not only to make demands on the quality of delivered drinking water, but also to institutionalize the organisation of the drinking water sector. This act formalized an already existing practice in which provinces can allow or forbid the establishment of new or extension of existing water supply companies. Until the turn of the nineteenth century, most of the water suppy companies were local and private initiatives. In the beginning of the twentieth century interlocal companies were established, often with the participation of municipalities. Municipalities and private persons were not willing to cooperate in all cases, however. To guarantee the efficiency of water works all over the country, several provinces developed their own initiative regulations for water supply, a practice later underpaved by the Water Supply Act.
Since 1975, most of the provinces have made plans for a further concentration of water supply companies. The number of companies was reduced from 102 in 1980 to 49 in 1990. But there are still plans for a further reduction to about 30. The provinces and the drinking water sector itself, as represented by the VEWIN (the Union of Dutch Water Supply Companies), agreed that the structure of the drinking water sector in its present form does not fit the demands fore securing clean water supplies in the future. They think that water supply companies can only maintain their tasks if they have a strong organisation, which implies sufficient technological know how and financial capacity.
The supply companies that use surface water for the production of drinking water have more problems with guaranteeing a good quality than those who use groundwater. The latter consider themselves to be relatively invulnerable, and that is why there is a lot of resistance among them against reorganisation plans. Their arguments are that they have never had problems with the supply of water, and that they always have had a good quality, that their charges are reasonable and that their customers are still satisfied (Van der Knaap, 1987) . Especially the smaller companies -mostly without the participation of provincial authorities -try to maintain their autonomy. But they face the burden of proof to demonstrate that they can still operate in an efficient way. The VEWIN is very cautious in taking a stand (VEWIN, 1989) . Actually, they support the idea of developing more professionality and efficiency in the drinking water sector. But the VEWIN tries to avoid a confrontation with the smaller companies, since it wants to be an organisation that represents the entire drinking water sector.
We conclude that, until the fifties the water supply sector may be qualified as a rather fragmented network. Though the companies shared a common purpose, they acted seperately. Water supply companies arose as local initiatives and for a long time they wanted to maintain their autonomy. Even today, the smaller ones are still fighting against provinces to revise reorganisation plans. After 1957, the sector became more integrated because of two developments. At first, reorganisations and fusions between companies caused scale enlargements in the sector and an increasing interrelatedness. Secondly, the interrelatedness and commitment within the sector increased because of the strenghtening of organisations that were developed to support the collectivity of companies, like the VEWIN (Dutch Union of Water Supply Companies) and the KIWA (a research institute for technological innovations in the water supply sector). The need for increasing efficiency in the sector encouraged a strong policy community with a strong technocratic approach to problems that the sector was encountering. Thus, these institutional changes were generated from inside the policy community, based upon a common perception of the way forward.
2.2
The water supply sector encountering the agricultural sector in an issue-network A serious threat to drinking water supply is the presence of nitrates in groundwater. More than 50 percent of Dutch withdrawal locations (especially in the east and the south) are likely to become unsuitable as a drinking water source in the near future. They are situated in areas with a sandy soil and many intensive cattle breeding farms (which tend to spread more manure on the soil than is necessary). Although there were indications that excess manure was being produced in some regions in the Netherlands as early as the mid-sixties, it took until the eighties -because of a competence struggle between the Ministry for Environmnetal Protection and the Ministry for Agriculturebefore the government seriously began to deal with the manure problem. The Soil Protection Act, which came into effect in 1987, is the first Dutch legislation that aims for integrated protection of the soil and the underground water. It is primary aimed at preventing excessive manuring, by intervening in the manure spreading on agricultural land. The Act contains a number of standards to fix the amount of manure which is allowed to spread out. These standards apply nationally. The Soil Protection Act also provides additional protection for areas in which groundwater needs to be withdrawn for the supply of drinking water. Provinces are authorized to establish so called `ground water protection areas' and to enforce in more restrictive manuring standards in these areas. The Act futher provides that farmers within the protected area should be financially compensated for the losses (disposal costs for the surpluse of manure) they suffer as compared to farmers outside the protected area. Requests by farmers for compensation will be dealt with by the provinces, which can collect funds for this by means of a charge paid by those who abstract ground water (mainly the water supply companies). The levy is related to the amount of water abstracted. Water supply companies can charge the consumers of drinking water for this levy. In fact, the consumers of drinking water pay for the production of a collective good (according to the profit principle).
The reason for the compensation provision was to prevent protests of farmers in groundwater protection areas who encounter more restrictions than farmers outside those areas. Legislators feared that the more restrictive standards in groundwater protection areas couldn't be enforced without compensation. The political parties on the left opened the discussion on a motion to reject the provision because it implicitly would admit a `right on pollution'. The provision was felt to contradict the `polluter pays' principle. In the event, the `equality principle' took precedence. The consumers of drinking water seem to have had no voice in this political debate. They pick up the costs of pollution caused by farmers, as they do in other countries like England and Germany.
The drinking water sector thus encounters a very strongly organised oponent from outside the sector, as far as the farmers are concerned. Although the agricultural sector only forms five percent of the active working population in the Netherlands, it has considerable influence in Dutch politics. Since 1954 the agricultural sector is nationaly organized in the Agricultural Board. The agricultural lobby is very effective, which is, for example, reflected by the fact that it usually is consulted in a very early stage of policy making. The Agricultural Board also has Regional Boards in each province that consult with the regional or local authorities, particularly about planning and land use. The regional boards play an important role in determining the manure policy for groundwater protection areas. They negotiate with the provincial authorities and with the water companies involved concerning the manure restrictions applicable in these areas, on the disposal of the resulting manure surpluses and how farmers are compensated for the losses they incur.
While the agricultural sector is strongly developed both at the national level and the regional and local level, the drinking water sector for a long time was not. Traditionally, water supply companies are organisations that are proud of their autonomy, as described in section 2.1. The VEWIN always played a modest political role. At best it was only active in emergencies, such as the bentazon affair in 1988. Normaly, the VEWIN mainly has a `service' function with respect to the drinking water branch. At the end of the eighties, the VEWIN became more politically involved and responsive, although the political discussion on the Soil Protection Act had already been concluded. Also, because of a presidential change (the presidency of VEWIN came into the hands of the governor of the province of Zuid-Holland) the VEWIN succeeded in moving the negotiations concerning the compensation in groundwater protection areas from the regional level (where one negotiator from the Agricultural Board representing the whole the country negotiated with each water supply company seperately) to the national level. Since then, the framework for regional negotiations is the state level.
We conclude that external interests and pressure on the water supply sector in some sense strengthened the sector as a policy community. It became a more tightly organised policy community, especially in terms of an increasing commitment between the members of the commmunity. In the meantime, however, the issue of agricultural pollution of groundwater confronted the water supply community with another strong policy community, the agricultural sector. This sector is very experienced and has a long tradition in lobbying and negotiating strategies. The agricultural sector as a network is not only characterised by a strong commitment, but also by a strong interrelatedness. This strong interrelatedness forced the water supply sector to participate in negotiations on a more aggregated (regional and national) level. In fact, it strengthened the interrelatedness within the water supply sector.
2.3
Consultation between water supply companies and farmer organisations as the most promising strategy
The discussion of the compensation provision shows that the regulatory strength (control capacity) of the authorities is very limited in the case of groundwater quality management. Although they try to regulate by means of ordinances and prohibitions, the enforcement of these rules is difficult. Therefore, a system has been choosen in which private organisations (water supply companies) have to participate in the enforcement of the rules The drinking water sector is beginning to define its role, however. (Jehae and Van Soest, 1990) The compensation provision formally implies that farmers can claim their losses against the province, which in its turn may charge the water supply companies that withdraw groundwater in that area. Water supply companies prefer to settle the matter in a a friendly atmosphere. They also want to control the disposal costs of manure surpluses and to avoid unnecessarily high bills. For both reasons, several water supply companies have started to meddle with the disposal of manure surpluses, which in itself is a very unusual task for a water supply company. Also an increasing number of companies is trying to buy out farmers in areas that are most vulnerable.
Although methods exist for purification of groundwater in the case of pollution with nitrates, the drinking water sector strongly opposes this option as long-term solution. The Director of VEWIN explains: "If the water supply companies started with complete purufication tomorrow, the polluters could no longer be forced to change their behaviour. We want to use the drinking water, and with that the consumer, as a crowbar for improving the environment" (Velema e.a., 1989) .
The strategy of consultation, choosen by the water supply companies to deal with agricultural pollution of groundwater, had already been tested by the companies needing to use surface water for their drinking water production. Those companies are mainly located in the western part of the Netherlands. They have huge problems with maintaining a good water quality. A great part of the pollution in these rivers stems from foreign industries, which means that they are dealing with extra-territorial actors. The director of VEWIN indicated that VEWIN only reluctantly develops new techniques for analysing water for the purpose of tracing polluters. However, the data often can be used to exert pressure on pollluting industries. For example, the City of Rotterdam has choosen to consult with polluting industries, even when they are abroad, rather than taking judicial action. Mr. F. Feith, of the City of Rotterdam, stated: "We try to handle the collected data very carefully, just because we want to get in conference with the discharging industries. Negative publicity will be applied only when the polluter is really unwilling. However, threatening publicity has proved to be a very strong instrument." (Jehae and Van Soest, 1990) This demonstrates that the drinking water sector realizes that it has its own role in water management, and that it can often reach further than any other authority. This seems to be true for the case of point source pollution. But is this also true for non-point source pollution? Consultation with polluters was regarded to be the only solution to the problem, since the national and provincial authorities were unable to guarantee strict enforcement of regulations. However, the case of groundwater protection areas also demonstrates that the possibility of using a consultation strategy heavily depends on the extent to which non-point source polluters are organised. The agricultural industry is very well organised and that may be one of the reasons why they became the first target group adressed by the Soil Protection Act in 1987.
In practice, the approved seems to have been based largely on selfregulation. Thus, the General Secretary of the Ministry for Agriculture, when he signed an agreement with the Agricultural Board concerning the use of pesticides, argued that for reduction of the use of pesticides by farmers, consultations with the target group, were also held. However, it remains very difficult for authorities and water supply companies to address the problem of non-point source polluters which are not very well organized. One of the reasons that is difficult to trace polluters is that pollution reaches the ground water only after a long period. Even if farmers stopped all manure spreading, it will still take fifteen to thirty years before the current nitrate pollution will come out with the groundwater that is used for the production of drinking water.
Finally, we may formulate some conclusions on the way in which water supply community dealt with external threats. On the one hand, water supply companies reacted in a very technocratic way by searching for technological innovations to satisfy the demand for drinking water of an acceptible quality. On the other hand, they tried to react against the Soil Protection Act which ignored the `polluter pays' principle. They didn't succeed in their opposition, although they were strongly supported by environmental groups. The water supply sector and the environmental groups have in common that they support the `polluter pays' principle. In this sense, the strong relation between the water supply sector and environmental groups can be conceived as the existence of a broader policy community. However, the interrelatedness in this community is weak: no strong or intensive interactions exist between both sets of actors. At the end, the `polluter pays' principle was not applied due to a succesfull lobby of the agricultural sector and due to the lack of political organisation and influence of the drinking water consumers. It appeared to be the most feasible political outcome to saddle up the consumers with the costst of pollution prevention.
Another indication for the existence of interests that are common to the water supply sector and environmental groups is that they both stress the importance of strict rule enforcement. However, water supply companies do realize that it is very difficult to control the spreading of manure. The control capacity of the regulatory agencies (provinces) is limited with respect to this. That is why the water supply sector does expect better results through direct negotiations with farmers' organisations. After the settlement of the compensation provision in the Soil Protection Act, `consultation with target groups' was left as the most promising strategy in the issue-network in which the water supply sector and the agricultural sector both participate.
3
The network of organisations involved in surface water management
Introduction
In this section we will focus on management of surface waters in the Netherlands. As described before: there are two aspects to this matter, quantity and quality. We will mainly focus on the quality network in this section, with certain exceptions. However, since two networks for waterquality and quantity overlap, we also describe much of the quantity network.
In section 3.2 we describe the authorities in the surface water quality network. The governmental organisations in the network are confronted with the outside world' differently when managing their two main tasks; collective wastewater treatment and reducing industrial emissions. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 deal with some aspects of these `extended networks' respectively. All sections focus on the consequences of institutional and other network characteristics on interorganisational processes.
Water quality management authorities
In 1970 the Pollution of Surface Waters Act (acronym in Dutch; WVO) came into force. The law was already proposed in 1964 after surface water quality in large parts of the Netherlands literally had become rotten and the problem was widely acknowledged, but it was not passed before 1969. It took so long because all kind of government authorities lobbied to become the principal authority in this field: central government agencies, provinces, water boards and municipalities. The law introduced the first general water quality regulations that were applicable to all surface waters in the Netherlands. The law discerns national surface waters that are managed by the national government and other waters that are managed under the responsibility of other (decentral) governments. The national (or; state) waters include the main rivers, the Waddensea and the North-Sea. The water quality task of the national government consists of giving management directives, water management planning, granting permits to dischargers into state waters (incuding the discharges of effluent of treatments plants of adjacent water boards), collecting charges from the same category of dischargers, measuring surface water quality and subsidice abatement measures, typically the building of treatment plants by waterboards. The responsible authorities for regional waters have the same activities, with the exception of subsidies, but with the important addition of building and exploiting water treatment plants ( CUWVO, 1990) .
The law assigns the responsibility for the regional waters to the provinces. However, the provinces are authorized to delegate these tasks to water boards or municipalities. This resulted in a delegation of the task by nine provinces to water boards. In 1993, however, one of the three remaining provinces delegated its task to a newly estabished water board and the other two are expected to follow soon. Nearly all treatment plants are managed by these provinces and waterboards. Municipal treatment plants hardly exist and are regarded a anachronism. The prime responsibility of municipalities in water quality management is the management of sewage systems and, to some extent as we will later show, pollution control of discharges into their sewage systems.
This complex configuration was a compromise in a long-time battle between provinces, waterboards and municipalities about the issue which government was to obtain the new water quality task, which they all were eager to undertake. Not only the delegation as such, but also the relations between provinces and waterboards afterwards, were influenced by the delegation arrangement in the law. Provinces have general tasks in supervising some of the policies of municipalities and waterboards. The way they supervise the waterboard policies on water quality varies largely. In cases the delegation was forced by the power of the water boards rather than the willingness of the provincial water agency supervision was much more intense.
Since 1970 more than once extensive debates on the future of the Dutch waterboard system occured in which not only the desirability of the water quality delegation was questioned, but even the existence of the waterboards themselves. General governments, like provinces and the Department for the Environment, challenged the assingment of these tasks to separate one-issue governments, like water boards. These discussions did lead to an extensive modernization effort by the water boards, but not to a real weakening of their position. At the outset, it was a closed network of people with an interest in water quantity management. The waterboards were considered a separate world, although they were formally government organisations. Also the scale at which they operated was very small. Because of their new tasks waterboards are now operating on a larger scale; many of them have merged. This means that waterboards are now more like government organisations than they ever were before. To a large extent professionalization has occurred, and more and more administrative and highly educated employees work for waterboards these days.
Also new interests are now represented in the Councils of the waterboards. These are: renters of agricultural property, inhabitants of the area in which the waterboards operate, domestic polluters, and industrial polluters. This, combined with a new policy planning structure, has led to a situation where waterboards now have to consult and coordinate with others more intensively than ever before. (Kienhuis, 1987: 423/424 ). Next to the challenges posed by other govermental organisations that claimed parts of their tasks, the water boards were also forced to integrate in the system and to open up to some extent because of characteristics of these new tasks themselves, demanding much more attention for getting the cooperation of other people than older engineering tasks.
These changes did not decrease the overall importance of the `Union of Waterboards', a private association in which all Dutch waterboards are united in defence of their common interests and to coordinate their policies on a voluntary basis. The way in which the Dutch surface water management is organized calls for much coordination. The association of waterboards plays an important role in this respect, without being dominant. Against the threat of a takeover of water quality responsibilities by the Ministry of Environmental Affairs (a threat to the water-oriented national level authorities and agencies), provinces (to waterboards), and even to environmental departments at the provinces (to public works departments of the same provinces), a common sense of `togetherness' is felt in the entire `water management world'. There is very little animosity between water quality managers at the national and the water board level. A further binding mechanism is the `cultural coordination', provided by a common education and training system. These factors explain why there are coordination mechanisms with a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of individual waterboards, that are consensus oriented, while having a broad array of participants. An example is the Commission on the Implementation of the Pollution of Surface Waters Act (CUWVO: see section 3.4).
Our conclusion is that the institutional and administrative structure of surface water management in the Netherlands is very complex, but that within the group of agencies directly involved a commom belief system, and a substantial degree of commitment and interrelatedness exist. That concerns only the inner core of the administrative actors, however. To characterize the broader network we should see it in action. Those actions imply contacts with people and organisations outside the inner `water community'. The `water community' meets different groups of organisations under different circumstances when working on its two main tasks: wastewater treatment and reducing industrial emissions. These fields will be discussed in separate sec-tions below.
The building of wastewater treatment works
In this part of our text we focus on the network activity of building Wastewater Treatment Works (WTWs). The building process includes several stages like financing the project, designing the plant, siting and permitting of the plant and actual construction. Because construction and design of plants is not problematic administratively, this section focuses on financing, siting, and permitting of the plant, in that order. For analysis of permitting and siting, we have conducted several interviews with representatives of municipalities, waterboards and others in july-august 1992.
One of the most distinctive features of Dutch water quality policy is the effluent charge that is used to finance nearly 100% of expenditures, including construction and operation of WTWs (see e.g. Brown and . The charge follows the rule that the polluter pays. The money raised by the charge has been used to build many WTWs.
In the Netherlands, WTW-construction typically is a waterboard task. In some cases, national waters benefit from WTW construction, and then a subsidy from the Public Work Agency is available, but usually, the waterboard pays all costs from the charge. For the waterboard, the charge system ensures that the costs of the treatment plant do not have to compete with other financial demands. On the other hand, those who pay are represented in the Council of the Waterboard and these representatives, although committed to the policy of their board, also consider it their task not to let the charge rise too quickly. Waterboard employees report that, because of the direct representation of groups with an interest who have to pay for the job, the waterboards cannot freely `tax and spend'. This `negative feedback'-mechanism is much weaker though than the one provided by the necessity to choose between a WTW and for instance a new `subtropical swimming paradise'. Dutch practice has shown that municipalities invest too little in their sewage systems, and instead invest in 'visisble' projects like luxury swimming pools.
Two other aspects of WTW construction are the siting and the permitting procedures. Work by Bressers (1992: 160-161) indicated that these are the most problematic parts of WTW construction in the Netherlands in terms of delay involved. There are two aspects to siting: one is the actual acquisition of a site, and the other is the changing of the zoning ordinance that is necessary in most cases. The permitting process involves four separate permit procedures in the Netherlands. Let us start with siting.
Land use regulations in the Netherlands are such that municipalities have to make land use regulations for the non-urban-areas. In most municipal zoning ordinances, the non-urban area is zoned as agricultural land, or as an industrial zone. WTWs are incompatible with almost any other use, except for industrial', and `public utilities' or literally `WTW'. WTWs are usually not built in industrial zones for several reasons. What this means is that the proposed site usually is in agricultural zones, and that the existing zoning ordinance has to be amended in most cases. The procedure for amendment is the same as the procedure for an original zoning ordinance. In fact, the amendment is considered to be a zoning ordinance itself. The procedure for the enactment of a zoning ordinance by municipalities is generally considered to be very difficult and time consuming. The planning regulations still reflect the post 1960s participation in planning fashion, although several amendments have been made in the 1980s. The procedures involve consultation with organisations, firms, and individuals, it involves public hearings, and commenting periods for the public. Once the city council has taken a final decision on the ordinance, the ordinance has to be approved by the province. People with objections to the city council can make objections at this level again. The province also hears the provincial planning commission, that consists of representatives of several governments, agencies, and interest groups as its members. After this, people with objections can file them with the minister of Planning, and after that with the highest administrative Court. The procedure if followed all the way may take five or more years.
Acquisition of the land usually is less problematic. The good financiall position of waterboards usually enables them to meet the demands of landowners (costs of land acquisition are small as compared to other costs in WTW construction). Waterboards usually ask a member of their Council that lives in the neighborhood of the proposed site to negotiate with the landowner. Many council men are farmers themselves, so they know the value of the property, and they can communicate with the landowners very well. This mechanism also plays a role in objections or appeals against zoning ordinances and permits. A member of the Council goes and talks with the objectors or plaintiffs. In some cases waterboards hire a negotiator who appraises the value of the land, and does the negotiations; the waterboard tells the appraiser what the maximum price is that it wants to pay.
The permitting process consists of several permit procedures. Depending on the type of water that the WTW will be discharging into (national or regional) waters, a water quality manager will have to either issue a discharge permit to itself, or apply for a permit with the Public Works Agency. Also, a building permit has to be issued by municipalities, a nuisance permit is required (a nuisance permit states limits to noise and odour levels at certain reference points), and a groundwater distraction permit has to be issued by the province.
In most procedures the network of participants is potentially wide. This is a consequence of the pro public participation philosophy of the Dutch government in the 1970s. In practice we found that the number of third parties actually participating in the process is small, and largely determined by personal interests. Interestingly, our data indicated that the length of the permitting and siting processes for WTWs was not so much determined by citizen participation, but rather by the need to gather information, and to communicate this information to the permitting agencies and by the lack of (skilled) personnel at the permitting agencies (See Huitema, 1993) . This is interesting because the Dutch government is currently revising many of these procedures, based on the assumption that citizen participation is too great a burden.
It appears that there is considerable interaction between the waterboards and municipalities meet and interact a lot. Waterboards and municipalities interact when zoning ordinances are drafted, and on the issue of the sewage system that is operated by the cities. These interactions may have a high frequency, but their goal is usually only consultation. One waterboard went so far as meeting the municipalities on a regular basis in order to keep informed of each others' plans. The relation between municipalities and waterboards has been described by several interviewees as one of mutual dependance; waterboards need municipalities for the siting of their WTW's (and for several permits), but municipalities, that have become increasingly environmentally conscious, have to have their wastewater treated, and in most cases this is exclusively a task of waterboards. On the other hand municipalities often oppose concrete suggestions for sites because they want to protect neighbouring citizens from nuissance or want to use the site or its direct surroundings for housing development.
There is a difference between financing on the one hand, and permitting and siting on the other. The financing of WTW construction is an issue that is determined by the water authorities themselves, and requires little external interaction, except when subsidies from the Public Works Agency can be obtained. Thus, it is an example of integrated policy-making. The other two issues, permitting and siting, require coordination with other actors. On the other hand, issuing a permit and finding a site are by definition temporary and local issues. The actors involved are geographically confined and once the permit has been issued, and a site has been found for a WTW, the interactions will cease. It is therefore debatable whether we can speak of a `network' that is involved in permitting and siting of WTWs or whether we should analyse each building process as a seperate ad hoc network. Nevertheless, in so far as these networks share common characteristics, we can speak about `the treatment plant building networks' in general.
Permitting and siting are not especialy complex as a task, yet the distribution of responsibilities and stakes among the participants involved is. The processes might create a lot of interaction, but this interaction often is restricted to a specific case, and can not be regarded as `interrelatedness' in general. The degree of `commitment', both general (sympathy with each others' main objectives) and specific (commitment to the job), varies considerably from case to case. On this basis, most of these ad hoc networks can be labeled as `issue networks' rather than policy communities.
Reducing industrial wastewater emissions
One of the main threats to surface water quality is the discharge of pollutants in industrial wastewater. We have already shown that for the main rivers, the coastal seas and the main waterways, the national government has the responsibility for water quality policies and their implementation. All other waters are under the responsibility of regional water managers (the provinces or the water boards most provinces delegated their tasks to). It is obvious that in the implementation process these organisations are not alone. There is a web of interactions evolves, that is often -and rightly-seen as the essence of the process. This section describes some aspects of these relationships.
In the case of the state waters, the national government is the responsible actor. This responsibility is mandated to the Public Works Agency. This agency has a decentralised structure. It consists of a central directorate, an important research institution (RIZA), some service departments and regional directorates. They coordinate in an informal working group called FWVO, although this coordination is regarded unsatisfactory (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1987: 11) . The existance of regional directorates means that the regional water authorities of a province often interact with a subagency of the Public Works Agency covering the same territory as the province.
The Public Works Agency and its subagencies deal with permit granting and enforcement, as do the regional waterboards do with the industries that discharge into their waters. There are some differences, however. One difference is that generely the direct dischargers into state waters are much larger companies than the dischargers into regional waters. Many of the country's largest industries are direct dischargers into state waters, especially the river Rhine and its various mouths. The second difference is that the subagencies lose the responsibility for indirect dischargers (into sewage systems that discharge into state waters) once a treatment plant has been build. That is because only the regional boards are entittled to build sewage treatment plants. Consequently these regional waterboards become themselves dischargers into state waters with the effluent of their treatment plants and are subject to permit granting from the Public Works Agency. Another consequence is that permitting of some categories of indirect dischargers becomes the responsibility of the regional waterboards instead of the Public Works Agency.
This complex constellation of actors calls for a strong coordination effort. Already by 1973 the Committee on the Implementation of the Pollution of Surface Waters Act (In Dutch: CUWVO) was establised by the Minister of Traffic and Public Works, which has the responsibily for water policies and who's ministry includes the Public Works Agency (RWS). This committee developed into `the common consultation organ of all parties involved in water quality management '. (CUWVO, 1990) . The CUWVO currenth has three functions: coordination, guiding research and giving advice on subjects such as administrative and judicial matters, implementation aspects of collecting effluent charges, the measurement of water quality and emission standards. It no longer confines itself to the water quality aspects that are regulated in the WVO. Other topics, like riverbeds and the finance of water quality management unrelated to point sources are now viewed as issues the CUWVO may address.
The CUWVO has three `layers'. These are; the committee itself, its working groups and their subgroups. The committe consists of two members each for the Union of Waterboards, the Public Works Agency and thè Interprovincial Consultation' (the association of Dutch provinces), one member each for the Association of Dutch Municipalities and the Ministry for Environmental Protection.
From a `policy network' point of view working group VI and its subgroups are the most interesting. They consist not only of governmental organisations but also of representatives of the target groups: representatives of branches of industry and Chambers of Commerce. The working group has prepared by far the largest number of recommendations. They are named reports', but are referred to by many water quality managers and others as policies', even in written documents (Dommel, 1992: 49) or `guidelines' (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1987: 16) , even sometimes by the CUWVO itself (CUWVO, 1992: 2) . Working group VI is one of the most important sources of new emission-oriented water quality policies. This means that group VI is the main platform for the development of new water quality policy. Due to its leading position it has been thought sensible to refer a `general' issue like enforcement of permits, to group VI. Working group VI consists not only of representatives of governments, but also of representatives of associations of industries. In the subgroups, the representatives of the relevant governments and representatives of firms of branch-organisations of the industry involved meet and negotiate emission standard-guidelines, scheduled for compliance, etc. That it works is certainly true for its effects on the policies of provinces and waterboards. The reports are accepted by the water quality managers and they hardly ever deviate from them (Strikker, 1988: 40, 48-49) . Firms of the same branch all over the country generely face the same demands, regardless of the water quality manager involved. Furthermore it is difficult for these firms to reject those demands as unreasonable, because their representatives in the subgroup agreed to them. According to the CUWVO Secretary General, there is even an evolving jurisprudence on this matter. Judges point to the reports in their verdicts. The firm has to have `a realy strong case' before being allowed dispensation. On the other hand, it is more difficult for water quality managers to demand more than the CUWVO agreement. They too will win the case in court only if they have `a very convincing case'.
All in all, the CUWVO provides a very important arena for the Dutch surface water quality network' in which almost all network organisations participate in consensus building. The consensus building orientation in the formulation of `policies' reflects a pre-existent orientation in daily implementation. An important background for this is the Dutch effluent charge system (See e.g. Brown and Bressers, 1986) . Here, we limit ourselves to some implications of the charge-system for interorganisational relationships. A very important aspect of the charge-system is that it directed the nature of the interactions into a much more `constructive' form of consulation because it let `pollution prevention pay'. Furthermore it provided the waterboards with an entrance to the firms, even when permit granting responsibilities did not provide that in the numerous cases of firms discharging to a municipal sewage system.
The position of indirect dischargers leads us to the relationship between water managers (both regional and national) and municipalities. The water manager originally only had an indirect relationship with the industries that discharge into a sewage system. They granted permits to the municipalities who discharge their sewage into the surface water and had of course the possibility to formulate conditions. But is was unclear how far they could go in their requirements.
This was not so much a problem in relation to the oxygen demanding pollutants. From early on it was decided that the effluent charge, which has this type of pollution as its main basis, could be levied directly by the watermanagers upon the firms (and households). That only implied that these firms had a strong incentive to decrease their discharge of organic pollutants, but also that waterboard officials had an entré into those companies with indirect discharges. They could legitimately discuss with these firms the organic pollution of their wastewater and the possibilities of decrease it. Because this also offered firms the possibility reducing their charges (via reducing their discharges) this facilitated the consultation process. On that basis, waterboard officials also often tried to discuss pollution from heavy metals and other pollutants. Indeed, they often claimed that certain discharges would not be allowed in the near future. Legally they had no basis for such statements. The waterboards also introduced an effluent charge on heavy metals on the basis of extra costs of operating treatment plants. Heavy metals polluted the remaining sludge of the plants which often has to be treated as chemical waste instead of sold as fertilizer. Although these activities, including the charge, did succeed in approximately halving the waste load of heavy metals in industrial wastewater, the situation was still considered unsatisfactory.
For this reason in 1981, the Pollution of Surface Waters Act was changed in order to give the water managers direct responsibility over a number of substances or categories of firms that were to be listed in a Governmental Decree. This was again some sort of victory of the water boards who had wanted that responsibility from the start, over the municipalities. Apart from the difficulties mentioned above, international agreements and treaties, for instance on `grey list' and `black list' substances, made such a change inevitable. For practical reasons it was decided not to list substances, but categories of firms as the new responsibility of the regional waterboards. The CUWVO played an imported role in selecting the branches of industry that were to be subject to the new regulations. Strikker (1988) concluded that some confusion remained regarding the selection of firms that should be included in the categories. Waterboards often tried to interpret the categories as broadly as possible in order to expand their jurisdiction. Strikker also found that while for `black list' substances zero discharges were the official goal, in practice this was translated into `best available means', which more often than not eroded further into `best practicable means'. One has to bear in mind that it was originally a deliberate choice not to use the latter criterion for `black list' substances.
The negotiation oriented approach of the water managers should not be seen as a cultural phenomemon only, but also as a rational use of scarce powers (cf. Bressers, 1992: 173-174) . Respondents of Strikker (1988) claimed that a stricter interpretation would not lead to a better environment, but only to more violations of requirements. Such a claim rests on a judgement of the possibilities to enforce the regulations. While the possibilities for enforcement by the water manager greatly improved by the shift in responsibilities from municipalities to water managers, in practice they are still weak. This is due to the dependance to other actors suchas judges and public prosecuters. A the fact that remained largely intact.
In order to reduce these dependencies, policy documents of water managers state that they prefer to use the option of administrative sanctions wherever possible instead of opting for penal law sanctions, which are also possible under the law (cf. Groningen, 1990) . In practice they try to avoid imposing sanctions altogether. Whenever they can they try to reach the goal of compliance by issuing exhortations or by, as a respondent in the Bressers 1983 study put it, `talking, talking, talking'. Illustrative of this is the recent CUWVO report (1992) on enforcement. This report is a sort of instruction guide. Its starting point is a flow chart. Starting with an observed offense, a few paths lead to actual sanctions. The text contains many warnings against the difficulties that occur when following these paths. `Less serious', `non-recidive', incidental' and `administrative demands having effect' can lead to a decision to issue only a warning, to legalize or even to tolerate without legalization, according to this guideline. In essence, the emphasis is on bargaining, not on compulsion.
In terms of the characteristics of this broader `network in action' we conclude that its complexity has not lead to fragmentation. Although the degree of commitment is limited, due to the natural tension between the polluters and the surface water quality managers, there is a rather high degree of interrelatedness. The polluters are represented in the board of the water autorithy, the actors involved participate in well developed negotiation platforms, and the implementation process involves regular contacts between authorities and industries, partly guaranteed by the existence of the effluent charge system.
Conclusions
In this article we considered the role of policy networks in Dutch water policy. In the Netherlands two rather separate networks of water institutions can be identified: one for soil protection and the provision of drinking water (the ground water network) and one for the treatment and discharge of wastewater (the surface water network). Before we compare these networks in terms of the concepts presented in section 1, we use this concluding section to compare the developments in the scope, the general approach and the openness of both networks.
Scope
The surface water network originated from the need for protection against flooding and the need to create an adequate system of waterways for draining. Later on (since 1970) the existing organisations (waterboards) tasks were extended to surface water quality management, because they already had knowledge of surface water. In other words, the network had to broaden its scope to also include the quality of the input of water into surface water systems, and -in order to do that properly -to also include aspects of the consumption of drinking water (to effect the amount and composition of polluted wastewater). The ground water network started with the production and supply of drinking water by water supply companies. These companies were increasingly confronted with the limitations of the amount of groundwater that can be subtracted without encountering other interest groups. Therefore they became involved in the protection of the quality of groundwater. The drinking water companies also had to broaden their scope to include several aspects of soil pollution. It is interesting to see that for both networks environmental quality issues were the main factors causing the extension of the scope of the network.
Approach
The networks are also similar in their dominant engineering approach to water problems.
The surface water network started with the establishment of a body that could undertake the building activities necessary for the protection against flooding and the development of waterways. There was no need for a behavioural change of target groups at that time. However, the task of waterboards extended to the management of water quality. It was the Pollution of Surface Waters Act that created the possiblity of stimulating polluters to meet the policy standards through behavioural changes by means of permit giving. It took some time before the Water Boards used this policy option with the same energy as they did with the `technological' approach. As far as industries as target groups are concerned, the Water Boards are making more and more efforts to legitimize their goals through consultations with branch organisations.
A similar development can be seen in ground water management. Initially, water supply companies tried to satisfy the need for drinking water via technical measures. Later on, however, they encountered the limits of growth because of other interests involved (especially agriculture). The agricultural pollution of ground water through fertilizers and pesticides became a major concern. In the long run, it is impossible to provide enough drinking water only through technical means, like purification. To protect the quality of groundwater for drinking water production, financial compensation for farmers and consultation with farmers are the main policy instruments.
This turned out to be a considerable change for organisations which traditionally were engaged in `pumping and presenting the bill'.
Openness
The overall view in both networks today is that an increasing `opening' can be perceived: the traditional organisations are incorporating or developing more expertise in consultation with other interest groups on which they depend. Although initially the dominant engineering approach was the main source of stability in both networks, instability arose because of the confrontation with interests of environmental protection and agricultural production. This caused a shift towards an approach in water management that is more directed to influencing the behaviour of other interests groups involved.
Also, a tendency can be perceived towards an aggregation of interests on a more central (national) level. In the surface water network, the Union of Water Boards tried mediation with representatives of industries within the national Commission on the Implemantation of the Pollution of Surface Waters Act (CUWVO). In the ground water network the Union of Dutch Water Supply Companies (VEWIN) tries to mediate with the Agricultural Board which is the main national representative of farmers in the Netherlands.
Besides the developments described, two other factors are accelerating the opening up of both networks. One factor is the initiative of the national authority -begun in 1985 -to enforce integration in Dutch water policy. Water institutions are pressed to consider the relationship of their activities with other sectors of water management and even with other policy sectors (especially environmental protection, nature conservation and urban and rural planning). Another factor is the general tendency -stimulated by provincial authorities -to increase the efficiency of water boards and water supply companies. In both networks, enlargement of scale and reorganisations are very common.
Commitment and interrelatedness
The water policy networks described above have complexity in common. Nevertheless the inner cores of the networks combine a high degree of commitment with a high degree of interrelatedness. In the surface water policy community this `tightness' has a long history. In the case of the drinking water sector thecharacter of policy community developed more recently. However, these interorganisational corelated communities encounter other interests whenever they start to act. The networks described incorporate these other interests in very different ways.
The surface water network is fragmented into rather separate issue networks when building treatment plants. The complex division of responsibilities is reflected in often difficult administrative processes. Though the building of treatment plants as such is a more or less straightforward task, these processes can take many years. Perhaps this kind of task would benefit from a more simple network structure, as evidence from the privatized facilities in the US seems to indicate (Heilman and Johnson, 1992) . In the case of the efforts to decrease industrial wastewater pollution the surface water network managed to remain in tact for a greater degree. The centrifugal influence of complexity is beset by all sorts of centripetal mechanisms that foster regular interaction and consensus building. The case shows that complexity does not always lead to fragmentation: a `weak commitment, strong interrelatedness'-type network emerged. The high degree of interrelatedness in the policy formulation stage leads to a relatively smooth implementation process, actually showing the expected emphasis on responsibility and the use of negotiated instruments, rather than relying on a strict judicial enforcement of regulations. Viewed against the background of the enormous variety and complexity of the changes in industrial production processes involved -when decreasing the pollution of industrial wastewater with a variety of substances-and also compared to the environmental policy sectors of air pollution and waste prevention, the surface water sector produced very good outcomes.
In these observations we see support for our view that the integration vs. fragmentation dimension should not be based on mere complexity variables and for the view of Goggin et al. that complex tasks may be better off with complex network structures.
The drinking water network is yet another case. Its core became integrated more recently and developed into an even tighter community under outside pressure. The background to this is that the participants in their activities were not only confronted with various outside actors, but with another, strong and long established policy community: the agricultural network. Though the various negotiation processes involved can be viewed as ad hoc issue networks, the opposers (the farmers) were supported by their general network relationships and thus forced the drinking water companies to seek a similar support in their own community, thus strenghtening their union, even though this union supports strong reforms in the sector's structure. A coalition with the environmental groups is more based on commitment than on interrelatedness and is still too weak to be considered as a part of thè network' in the proper sense of the term.
